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Abstract: The primary purpose of this research is to analyze theoretically the group decision-
making process leading to the allocation of activity time and the consumption of goods, with 
particular emphasis in the households. Each household is characterized as a group of 
individuals making joint decisions about their activity participations, alternative activity time 
allocations and consumption of various goods, such as independent and joint activity time 
allocations as well as private and shared consumption patterns. We firstly explore why 
individual-based models are not realistic in multi-person households, and secondly, we 
summarize various intra-household activity time allocation models based on different 
decision-making processes. All models are presented under microeconomic principle of utility 
maximization to represent the economic behavior of the households. 
 
Key Words: Intra-household activity time allocation, unitary models, bargaining models, 
collective models 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Activity time allocation and duration models are the major focus in recent methodological 
developments and innovative transport demand models such as activity-based travel analysis. 
The underlying behavioral representation of such models, however, is not easy, as they 
require modeling of human behavior. There are number of sound conceptual and behavioral 
reasons for studying activity time allocation, such as to analyze travel behavior, to examine 
transport policy options and to evaluate transportation infrastructures, to name only a few. 
The research attempts for developing realistic and estimable models of daily activity time 
allocation and activity duration have been a subject of theoretical foundations and empirical 
explorations for at least 20 years in the field of transportation, and subsequently, there have 
already been significant progresses in some modeling issues. 
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In the development of the activity time allocation models, or related travel demand and 
activity behavior analysis, transportation researchers have to make a decision between 
individual-level analysis and household-level analysis. While most existing research are based 
on individual-level analysis, these models do not represent the realistic behavior of time 
allocation decisions because an individual usually live in a household with other family 
members. The household members usually interact each other to make time allocation and 
travel decisions. Some behavioral characteristics and attributes are only observable at the 
household level. Utility maximization can be thought of occurring at the household level. For 
example, an individual household member may wish too go for recreational trip, however, 
due to obligations related to another household member, instead, chooses to stay in the 
household and watch television. Identification of the linkages across different members of a 
household that reflect sharing of the same activity and/or the making of the joint travel is very 
important for travel and activity system analysis.  
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the decision-making mechanism of a 
collective group leading to the allocation of activity time and to explore theoretically the 
possible microeconomic models of intra-household activity time allocation, with particular 
emphasis in households. Each household is characterized as a group of individuals making 
joint decisions about their activity participations and travel choices. Several decisions are 
made by collective groups and not by individual agents including independent and joint 
activity time allocation as well as private and shared consumption of goods. A brief review of 
existing literatures on activity time allocation modeling has been discussed in Section 2. We 
have summarized the advantages and importance of household-based models over individual-
based models in Section 3. In Section 4, various mathematical models of intra-household 
activity time allocations are presented. The proposed models are explicitly derived within a 
microeconomic principle of utility maximization and social welfare theory that provides 
insights into the behavior of the households regarding alternative activity time allocation and 
travel decisions. Based on intra-household decision making strategies, two distinct intra-
household models viz. unitary intra-household activity time allocation models and non-
unitary intra-household activity time allocation models are presented. Section 5 concludes the 
paper along with the direction for future research. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing literatures in activity time allocation and duration models can be broadly grouped 
into three groups: microeconomic models (will be discuss below), structural equation system 
models (see Golob 2001), and hazard based duration models (see Mannering et al. 1994, 
Ettema et al. 1995, Bhat 1996). Among these, microeconomic utility maximization models are 
the basis of most existing research because of their well-established mathematical base. 
Microeconomic models assume that the individuals make choices concerning the allocation of 
time and money to different activities and consumption goods to maximize their daily total 
utility. The seminal paper by Becker (1965) that laid the foundation for explicitly 
incorporating time components in the direct utility function through ‘final commodities’ and 
time constraint in the utility maximization problem has greatly enhanced not only economists’ 
interests but also time use researchers, urban planners and transportation professionals. 
Various extensions on Becker’s model has been proposed and extended (see Jara-Dias 1998 
and Kraan 1996 for detail discussions of the progresses). DeSerpa (1971) made an important 
extension to directly incorporate activity time allocation component in direct utility function 
in addition to consumption of goods and theoretically proposed three distinct components of 
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value of time; value of time as a resource (VOTR), value of activity time (VOAT) and value 
of saving time (VOST) in the consumption-time constrained activity. 
 
Kitamura (1984) introduced random utility models of activity time allocations to discretionary 
activities, under utility maximizing principle, to formulate estimable models of activity time 
allocation. Yamamoto and Kitamura (1999) further extended these works incorporating 
interactions between working and non-working days. Bhat and Misra (1999) employed the 
same concept to model weekly discretionary activity time allocations between in-home and 
out-home and between weekdays and weekends. Recently, Meloni et al. (2004) analyzed the 
time allocations to discretionary in-home and out-home activities including trips using 
Nested-Tobit model. These models have used only activity time allocation components in 
their direct utility function with only time constraint. On the other hand, Kockelman (2001) 
developed a model for time and budget constrained activity demand analysis in 
microeconomic utility maximizing foundation using Roy’s identity. Prasetyo et al. (2003) and 
Fukuda et al. (2003) considered the effects of motivational factors of time allocations under 
time and money constraints. The methodology for estimating value of activity time (VOAT) 
has been introduced in these papers. 
 
These traditional microeconomic models of individual activity time allocation clearly lack a 
number of important considerations. First, the majority of these models have considered only 
activity time allocation components in direct utility function with only time constraint in 
constrained utility maximization. On the other hand, there are a lot of research works in 
household economic literatures, which consider only good consumption components in direct 
utility function with only income constraint in resource allocation problems. These two 
extremes of research are based on the same principle of utility maximization, but motivated 
from the self-interests in the sense that economists focus on goods and transportation 
researchers focus on time. The integrated model with both time allocation and good 
consumption components in directly utility function under time and money constraints are 
important for modeling activity time allocations. Some of the recent researches have 
considered the income constraint (Kockelman 2001, Prasetyo et al. 2003). Second, the 
existing researches are based on the assumption that the marginal utilities of all activities are 
equal. Their argument is that, if not equal, the individual is free to allocate more time to those 
activities whose marginal utilities are higher and finally allocates the optimal time to each 
activity with equal marginal utility. In reality, however, the marginal utilities of all activities 
might not reach to their optimal values because individual might be forced to reduce time 
allocations to some activities due to other constraints such as income, time pressures etc. The 
recent papers by Prastyo et al. (2003) and its extension by Nepal et al. (2004a) have explored 
this phenomenon and concluded that the marginal utilities of all activity types may not be 
equal. Nepal et al. (2004a) presented a framework to incorporate marginal utility differences 
considering variance heterogeneities across activity types. Third, the existing time allocation 
models ignored the latent determinants of activity time allocations such as needs, priorities, 
time pressures etc., which are difficult to measure directly, but they do have influential effects 
on activity time allocations. Recent paper by Nepal at al. (2004b) has derived a mathematical 
model to incorporate latent determinants of activity time allocations. 
 
However, microeconomic models discussed so far are based on the notion of ‘individual 
traveler’, ‘individual decision making process’ and ‘individual choice’ regarding activity time 
allocations and travel decisions. These research works lack another important and realistic 
fact that each individual is more or less associated within the household, where each 
individual household member care other member(s) and, they also share common household 
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goods. The intra-household activity time allocation decisions are affected by the 
characteristics of the households they belong to, the resources available to them and the 
constraints they have to face to satisfy household needs. These household needs are usually 
achievable through participating to a number of activities that must be performed by one or 
more household members within a specific time period. Hence, the intra-household activity 
time allocations are generally derived from the characteristics of the household they belong to, 
the intra-household decision making process and the degree of association among household 
members. Household Activity-Travel Simulator (HATS) methodology, a game theoretic 
simulation, was used to better understand household travel decisions and the constraints 
within which those decisions are made (Jones, 1979). In this analysis, spatial components of 
activity-travel patterns are represented on the map, and temporal components are represented 
on the timelines, using activity diary data of all members of a household. When a policy 
measure is introduced, household members discuss together considering changes of 
constraints on the game board, and then new activity-travel patterns are simulated in this 
board. Such game theoretic simulation is especially interested in inter-personal linkages and 
constraints, gaining more realistic responses than simply asking hypothetical questions. 
 
Existing microeconomic models to incorporate the household effects in time allocation 
modeling are using few explanatory variables related to household characteristics. To the best 
of our knowledge, none of the existing models have treated explicitly the household as the 
unit of analysis in activity time allocation modeling except few attempts in the last few years 
(Gliebe and Koppleman 1999, Zhang et al. 2004). The actual unit of analysis for modeling 
activity time allocations is the household just like the unit of analysis in the theory of 
consumption and the demand for travel is not only affected by the personal behavior but also 
by the household decision making process. Other important aspects to study household, as a 
decision-making unit, are the distribution/allocation of time and household income among the 
members within their time and money budget limits. These two constraints are conceptually 
different in the sense that the total time available to each member of the households is equal 
(for example one day) but the individuals’ incomes are different. Household income plays 
very significant and different role than the individuals’ time constraint and both constraints 
are equally important in the modeling of activity time allocation behavior. The issue of what 
determines intra-household activity time allocations is important to travel behavior analysis 
for the same reasons the study of intra-household consumption is important in household 
economics. Household models are useful for understanding joint and allocated activity 
participation and effects of household income in its members’ time allocation decisions. 
 
 
3. HOUSEHOLD AS THE UNIT OF TRAVEL BEHAVIOR MODELING 
 
While the households as the fundamental units of analysis remain central to microeconomic 
consumer behavior and marketing theory to know how many consumption and/or marketing 
decisions are made by the households, it has received relatively insufficient attention, if not 
completely ignored, from scholars in the areas of transportation and travel demand modeling. 
This lack of attention is due to a restrictive notion of the role of households in activity time 
allocations and good consumption decisions. Research so far has focused mainly on 
individual traveler’s final decision outcomes (who are seen to carry out the activities) and to a 
much lesser degree on decision processes (how do they arrive at that). As the question of who 
allocates the time to different activities has been explored extensively, findings became 
repetitive and interest in intra-household decision-making began to grow recently. At the 
same time, research that attempted to deal with household in terms of all its interpersonal 
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nuances has been hampered by a dearth of appropriate metaphors to talk about such behavior; 
e.g. most theories of behavior and personality in psychology are at the individual level and, 
given that family is not a simple sum of two or more individuals, individual theories of 
behavior and personality do not facilitate an explanation of behavior observed in households. 
 
The household is the primary decision making unit. Household members carry out household 
decisions by engaging in various activities. Decisions to participate in different activities as 
well as who participates are the results of negotiation and role and task and time allocation 
within the households. Travel decisions are derived from the pursuit of activities to satisfy 
household needs. Most of the travel is habitual and travel patterns do not commonly shift day 
to day. Households adapt to sufficiently large stimuli by changing activity patterns and 
consequently, travel within time and money constraints. The household is an institution of 
social control that 'governs' the daily time and task allocations of household members to 
different activities by some informal household rules and control strategies. Intra-household 
resource allocation makes available important information on household dynamics that 
influence daily time allocation and, therefore, should prove a valuable contribution to efforts 
to model activity time allocation behavior and its impact on transportation. 
 
It is well known that members of a household unit often interact in making decisions. It is not 
always the case that each individual inside the household have the same preferences. 
Heterogeneities in preferences do occur across members but they do also have some collective 
decision making process. Only recently, transport researchers are realizing the importance of 
intra-household decision-making process for alternative activity participations. How 
household members interact and make the decisions of time and task allocations before 
performing and allocating individual members and their times to different activities is very 
important for realistic representation of the activity time allocation behavior. The daily out-of-
home activities are not only the independent activities but also the shared ones. The members 
of the household jointly involve on certain shared activities in space and time. These joint 
activities certainly require interaction and understanding of household members and, the 
decision of which is usually made at the household level. Going for the dinner tonight 
together or doing shopping jointly today or sharing the same auto up to the nearby transit 
station are some examples of shared activities. Even for some independent activities, the 
decisions are made at the household level. For example, decisions such as who is picking up 
the children from school or childcare center, who is doing the daily shopping activities today, 
who will join the work force and who is free today for recreation etc. are usually made from 
the consensus among the household members and involve task allocation (Jhang et al. 2004). 
In this sense, majority of decisions for activity time allocations and travel decisions are made 
at the household level rather than the individual levels. 
 
The complex activity participation and/or travel decisions involving multi-persons household, 
result form a collective decision making process inside the household. However, the 
complexity and sparseness of interactive intra-household models has made the slow progress 
in the area of transport research. The most fruitful results of such models for activity based 
transportation planning is to better understand household joint (share) activity participation. 
Moreover, such models also allow identifying the relative influence or power of household 
members. The ability or inability of the individuals as members of the household unit to 
rearrange their schedules, share responsibilities, honor joint activity commitments and 
allocate tasks to each member comprise an often overlooked set of behavioral responses to 
perturbations in transportation environment (Gliebe and Koppleman, 2002). However, even 
still today, there is an absence of clear conceptual work on a collective model of intra 
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household time allocation. The existing models for intra-household activity time allocation 
are concentrated on how to define the individual utility function and household utility 
functions. One stream of the models assumes that the individual utility function is 
independent of the other members’ arguments of utility, and interaction occurs from 
composite utility using interaction parameters (Zhang et al. 2004). In the other stream of the 
models, the interactions were introduced in such a way that one member’s utility also depends 
on the other members’ arguments of the utilities. In this research, we assumed individual 
member’s utility is dependent on other household members’ utility through joint activity 
participation and shared consumption bundles. 
 
 
4. MICROECONOMIC MODELS OF INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ACTIVITY TIME 
ALLOCATION 
 
4.1 Notations 
 
W  Twice continuously differentiable strongly concave household welfare function per 
period; 
nu  Twice continuously differentiable strongly concave total utility of the individual 
n derived from the participation of different joint and independent activities and 
consumption of private and shared goods per period; 
n  Individual inside the household (total numbers of individuals are N ); 
T  Total time available to each household member per period; 
i
nt  Gross time allocated to independent activity i I∈ by an individual n N∈  per period 
(total number of independent activities = I ) = n ni ia tt+ ; 
n
ia  Net activity duration of independent activity i I∈  of an individual n N∈ ; 
n
itt  Travel time required to access to independent activity i I∈  for individual n N∈ ; 
jt  Gross time allocated to joint activity j J∈  per period (total number of joint activities 
= J ) = j ja tt+ ; 
ja  Net activity duration of joint activity j J∈ ; 
jtt  Travel time required to access to joint activity j J∈ ; 
n
wt  Time allocated to market labor by individual n N∈  = n nw wa tt+ ; 
n
wa  Working hours of an individual n N∈  per period; 
nw  Wage rate of individual n N∈ ; 
n
wtt  Travel time for work commute for individual n N∈ ; 
n
kx  Private good k K∈ (total number of private goods = K ) consumed by the individual 
n N∈  in the household per period; 
sx  Shared good s S∈ (total number of shared goods = S ) consumed by the household; 
n
itc  Travel cost to access to independent activity i I∈ for individual n N∈ ; 
n
wtc  Travel cost to access to work location for individual n N∈ ; 
jtc  Total travel cost to access to joint activity j J∈ for all individuals in the household; 
kp  Market price of the independent good k K∈ ; 
sp  Market price of the shared good s S∈ ; 
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ny  Unearned income of individual n N∈ ; 
 
 
4.2 Groupings of Activities and Consumption Bundles 
 
An individual member’s total time can be allocated to the vector of independent activities 
I (1,..., ,...,i I ) or to the vector of joint activities J  (1,..., ,...,j J ). Similarly, the household 
consumption can be either private consumption bundle K ( 1,..., ,...,k K ) or the shared 
consumption bundle S (1,..., ,...,s S ) as shown in Figure 1. Here, I  is the universal set of 
independent activities and K  is the universal set of private consumption bundle for all 
household members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Activity set and consumption bundles for household members 
 
 
4.3 Intra-Household Decision Making Process 
 
Microeconomic theory is based on the model of rational individual, maximizing his/her utility. 
However, while most individual times and monetary incomes may accrue to individuals, the 
majorities of individuals live and make their decisions within multi-member households. 
Time and money expenditure decisions are not necessarily made by the isolated individual but 
by the individual within the framework of household society. It is, therefore, extremely 
problematic to consider decisions regarding allocation of time and money, which are the 
principal decisions made by the households, on the basis of individual utility functions. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the theoretical basis for understanding intra-household decision-
making process of resource allocation from economic viewpoint has seen three distinct 
developments. The earlier attempts during 1950-1970’s assume that a household, even if it 
j
n
i
sk 
Private  
consumption bundle 
(K) 
Shared  
consumption bundle 
(S) 
Joint activity set (J)
Independent activity set (I)
Household members (N)
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consists of different individuals, acts as a single decision making unit. In a nutshell, the 
unitary models say that the behavior of the household mimics that of utility maximizing 
individuals; the models of decision-making mechanism of a household are the justification of 
a simple utility-maximization model. Consequently, household decisions are the observable 
results of maximization of fixed household preferences (utility function) under resource 
constraints. Samuelson (1956) derives ‘social indifference curves’ for the households that 
have the properties as that of individual indifference curves. The economics of the family 
brought into mainstream by Gary Becker deal with this type of intra-household decision-
making behavior and often called ‘unitary models’. Unitary models assume the existence of 
only one set of preferences that matters when decisions are made and assuming that those 
preferences constitutes rational behavior; the household will behave in a rational manner. 
Such household behaviors are observable in the case of ‘common preferences households’ 
(everyone in the household has the same preferences in making household decisions) and 
‘dictator households’ (All the household decisions are made by the ‘BOSS’ of household who 
has all powers and makes all the decisions according to his or her preferences without 
including the feelings of other members). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Models of intra-household decision-making process 
 
 
The second approach, called Nash bargaining approach, analyzed the household decision 
making process from cooperative bargaining framework calling into question the earlier 
unitary model. The bargaining models differ from unitary models in that they seek to 
endogenize the bargaining power of different members of the households (Manser and Brown 
1980, McElroy and Horney 1981). These bargaining approaches yield an efficient resource 
allocation. This is because of the implicit assumption that there are no imperfect information 
commitment problems within the household. Chiapori (1988) pioneered the third approach, 
called sharing-rule approach, of intra-household decision making that does not required an 
explicit bargaining frameworks. The only assumption made in this approach is that the 
household decisions are Pareto efficient. Non-unitary models either in the form of bargaining 
or the sharing rule approaches are the realistic, but complex behavioral representations of 
intra-household decision-making process inside the multi-person households. 
 
Models of Intra-household 
decision-making Process 
1. Unitary Household Models
(Traditional Approach) 
Non-unitary Household 
Models
2. Bargaining Models 
(Nash Bargaining Approach) 
3. Collective Models 
(Sharing Rule Approach) 
Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 1637 - 1650, 2005
1644
 
 
4.4 Unitary Intra-Household Activity Time Allocation Model 
 
The standard theory of consumer behavior is an example of the economic problem: 
households are needs and desires that they want to satisfy. But they have to make choices 
because they are limited in their possibilities. A fundamental assumption made in the unitary 
intra-household model is that the households needs and desires are fully captured by the 
rational preference ordering over alternative activities and goods so that they are well-
behaved units. Unitary models treat each household as a black box; the models do not address 
how decisions are made but only what the outcome is. Such models are either ‘common 
preferences’ models or ‘dictator’ models in which household maximizes single household 
utility function with pooling of family incomes. The household preferences are usually 
assumed to be represented by a unique well-behaved household welfare function and explicit 
choices are deduced from the maximization of household utility function under resource 
constraints. Let us assume that the utility of an individual is derived form all activity 
participation and good consumption within the fixed period (DeSerpa, 1971) and the 
household welfare function is the constant function of individuals’ utility arguments as shown 
in equation (1). Note that the time allocated to market labor (work time and commuting time) 
is not included in the direct utility function. 
 
Maximize: 
{( , , , ), , , , , }n ni j k sW W t t z z n i w j k s= ∀ ≠       (1) 
Subject to: 
0n nw i j
i j
T t t t n− − − = ∀∑ ∑        (2) 
( ) 0n n n n n n nw w k k s s w i j
n n k n s n n i j
y w t tt p z p z tc tc tc+ − − − − − − ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ (3) 
Here, the household utility function with arguments of time allocations and consumptions of 
goods of all individuals inside the household is assumed to be constant and maximized under 
individual time constant and household budget constant to arrive at the optimal time 
allocations and good consumption bundles. 
 
 
4.5 Non-Unitary Intra-Household Activity Time Allocation Models 
 
The unitary models clearly lack several behavioral realisms. First, this approach does not 
explicitly takes into account the notion that the household is a group of individuals, with 
different preferences, and among whom an intra-household decision making process takes 
place. In fact, a household can be seen as a micro-society that consists of several individuals 
with their own rational preferences. Observed household time allocations and good 
consumption patterns can in this sense be considered as a social state chosen by the household 
members. Secondly, the unitary household model leaves no room to see the intra-household 
time and money allocations, and consequently, of welfare. To overcome such drawbacks of 
the unitary household model, non-unitary intra-household models that explicitly take into 
account the fact that multi-person households consists of several members which may have 
different preferences are proposed in economic literatures. Among these household members, 
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an intra-household bargaining approach and sharing rule approach (decision making process) 
is assumed to take place. 
 
For all non-unitary intra-household models, the preferences of the household members 
regarding the optimal allocation of resources (time and money) need not be the same and they 
are assumed to be independent. Each person has the separate utility function of the form: 
{( , , , ), , , , }n n n ni j k su u t t z z i w j k s n= ∀ ≠ ∀      (4) 
 
 
4.5.1 Nash-Bargained Intra-household Activity Time Allocation Models 
 
The intra-household bargaining models explicitly address the question of how individual 
preferences lead to a solution of bargaining problem. The bargaining problem can be stated: 
 
“A bargaining problem requires specifying a set of feasible payoff combinations and a payoff 
combination that obtains in the case of a breakdown of a negotiations”. 
 
Maximizing individual utility function (4) at the given level of utility of other members’ 
utilities under individual time constraints and household total income constraint yields 
optimal solutions for time allocations and good consumption bundles. If the bargaining 
process ends without a solution, each individual obtains a disagreement payoff, which is also 
called the threat point payoff. 
 
In the presence of joint activity participation and shared goods within the household and 
companionship, loving and caring etc, the intra-household bargaining problem is a 
cooperative game approach and now widely used in economics. The cooperation understood 
in the sense of game theory. The cooperative bargaining models has three basic assumptions: 
(i) There is no feasible payoff combination that has higher payoff for all players than a 
bargaining solution (ii) there is a bargaining process inside the household to intra-household 
decisions and (iii) the outcome of the bargaining problem shall be strictly better for all players 
than the disagreement payoff. The Nash-bargained solution to the resource allocation problem 
dictates that all members jointly choose the arguments in the utility function to maximize the 
gains from living together. All individuals inside the household solve the resource (time and 
consumption) allocation problem. The household decision process is assumed to lead to a 
Pareto efficient allocation, and household members jointly maximize the following household 
utility function:  
 
Maximize: 
 [ ]n n
n
W u φ= −∏          (5) 
Subject to: 
0n nw i j
i j
T t t t n− − − = ∀∑ ∑        (6) 
( ) 0n n n n n n nw w k k s s w i j
n n k n s n n i j
y w t tt p z p z tc tc tc+ − − − − − − ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ (7) 
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The value of nu  is given by (4) and nφ  is the threat point (maximized indirect utility which 
member n would achieve outside of the household) and given by  
( , , ; )n n n ns kp p y Eφ φ=          (8) 
Bargaining models differ from the unitary models in that the decision making process within 
the household is explicitly specified. Furthermore, the emphasis in the bargaining models is 
on who actually controls the resources. 
 
 
4.5.2 Collective Intra-Household Activity Time Allocation Models 
 
Chiappori (1988) pioneered another approach to non-unitary household models that does not 
require an explicit bargaining framework. As emphasized by Browning and Chiappori (1998), 
the intra-household decision-making process cannot be represented by a unique household 
utility function. Each household is a political place, characterized by conflicts of interests, but 
also companionship and share. Each member in the household is an economic agent, endowed 
with a set of preferences. In sharing rule approach, each household decision is the outcome of 
the collective understanding and sharing between its members. The collective framework has 
the advantages of encompassing both unitary models and bargaining models. The general 
formulation of collective household model is to optimize individual utility function: 
 
Maximize: 
{( , , , ), , , , }n n n ni j k su u t t z z i w j k s n= ∀ ≠ ∀      (9) 
Subject to: 
0n nw i j
i j
T t t t n− − − = ∀∑ ∑        (10) 
( ) 0n n n n n n nw w k k s s w i j
n n k n s n n i j
y w t tt p z p z tc tc tc+ − − − − − − ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ (11) 
These collective household models are more general and based on the assumption that the 
household wastes nothing- that is, its allocation is Pareto efficient. That is, chosen activity 
time allocation and consumption bundles are such that an individual’s welfare cannot be 
increased without decreasing the welfare of one of the other household members. The Pareto 
efficiency is the most generalization of the assumption of the utility maximization in the 
unitary models with several household members. Thus, the collective household model can be 
formulated using the standard instruments of welfare economics. Household chooses 
consumption to: 
 
Maximize: 
{( , , , ), , , , }n n n ni j k su u t t z z i w j k s= ∀ ≠       (12) 
Subject to: 
' ' ' '{( , , , ), , , , } , 'n n n ni j k su t t z z i w j k s u n n∀ ≠ = ∀ ≠      (13) 
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0n nw i j
i j
T t t t n− − − = ∀∑ ∑        (14) 
( ) 0n n n n n n nw w k k s s w i j
n n k n s n n i j
y w t tt p z p z tc tc tc+ − − − − − − ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ (15) 
where 'nu is some required level of welfare for individual 'n n≠ . Thus the maximization of 
this problem seeks an allocation that maximizes welfare of individual n at the given value of 
' , 'nu n n≠ and household full income constraint. By varying ' , 'nu n n≠ , all Pareto efficient 
allocations can be traced out. This set of Pareto efficient allocations forms the boundary of 
utility Possibility Frontier, which captures all attainable vectors of utility levels for the 
household. For the case of only 2 members household, this utility possibility frontiers can be 
shown in plan as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Utility Possibility Frontier 
This is an important result because it allows us to characterize all Pareto efficient allocations 
as stationary points of the linear social welfare function (Household Welfare Function) for 
some positive welfare weights for both individuals. That is, the household allocation problem 
can be defined as the unique solution to the following maximization problem:  
 
Maximize: 
, 1,  {( , , , ), , , , }n n n n n n ni j k s
n n
W u u u t t z z i w j k s nθ θ= = = ∀ ≠ ∀∑ ∑  (16) 
Subject to:  
0n nw i j
i j
T t t t n− − − = ∀∑ ∑        (17) 
( ) 0n n n n n n nw w k k s s w i j
n n k n s n n i j
y w t tt p z p z tc tc tc+ − − − − − − ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ (18) 
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where nθ  is the Pareto weight or welfare weight or bargaining power assigned to individual 
n . We have no theory about where this weight comes from. The welfare function (16) may 
be interpreted as being a sort of weighted average of individual preferences. 
 
5. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research proposes general microeconomic models of intra-household activity time 
allocation, explicitly considering household as the unit of analysis. This is an important shift 
in the activity time allocation modeling paradigms from individual-based to household-based. 
We have discussed the appropriateness of household-based models over individual ones, 
summarized three different types of intra-household decision making strategies and presented 
various microeconomic models of intra-household activity time allocations. The proposed 
models underscore the realistic behavioral contexts for parameter estimation and econometric 
forecasting. If found acceptable from practical point of view, these models will be the 
cornerstone to model the activity time allocation behavior, and, hence, enhancement of 
activity based travel demand analysis. 
 
There are more research works still to be done. First, the proposed microeconomic models 
have to be specified into estimable econometric models so that the model parameters could be 
estimated from the statistical data collected from the households. Second, development of an 
effective way of collecting information or data from the households are very important. This 
is because existing activity based surveys do not cover the information required by these 
household-based models. Third, the detail empirical analysis is required in order to analyze 
the practical efficiency of the models. 
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